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We thank the reviewers for a number of thoughtful and
useful comments on the papers in this session. The
instructions and data set received from the organizers were
common to the three papers developed for this special
session on modeling. Nevertheless, each study reflects the
particular idiosyncrasies of the researchers and results on a
very different approach to modeling a productive enter-
prise. The task for reviewers, therefore, is demanding.
Reviewers’ suggestions span a broad range of topics.
Most comments have to do with modeling issues, some
emphasize issues related to the theoretical model, others
emphasize issues related to the empirical model, and yet
others have suggestions that touch both theory and
empirics. In trying to respond to their concerns we find it
useful to group our responses accordingly.
1 Theoretical modeling issues.
Førsund raises the most important issues relative to the
economic model of choice. He questions the general choice
of dynamic cost minimization as a theoretical model of
firm behavior. The most important comment has to do with
the assumption of this model in terms of firms’ output.
Dynamic cost minimization does assume that producers
expected relative prices, output levels, and public input
levels persist indefinitely. Every period, as new prices,
output, and public inputs are observed, producers revise
their expectations and re-optimize. That is to say that when
deciding the optimal investment strategy for this period,
the firm knows future input prices and output. We agree
with this comment that this is an over simplifying and
unrealistic assumption of this type of model of firm
behavior. The alternative dual type models would be static
cost minimization and dynamic profit maximization. If we
were to, instead, use a static cost minimization approach
we would be assuming ignorance about next period’s
output, moreover we would be implying that the firm does
not really care about next period output when minimizing
cost this period. If we, instead, would choose dynamic
profit maximization we would be assuming knowledge of
the output price trajectory, instead of the output quantity, in
addition to the input prices trajectory when firms decide
this period. None of these two alternative approaches are
satisfactory either. We did stretch over the static approach
to recognize that firm behavior today is affected by infor-
mation about tomorrow and yesterday. And in fact, in our
implementation of this model we do know the output tra-
jectory during the years of analysis. We, nevertheless agree
with Førsund, and think that dynamic profit maximization
accounting for uncertainty and expectation formation
would be a worthy next step.
A number of other issues are raised with respect to our
modeling of government behavior. Førsund as well as
Tsionas find our approach of a benevolent social planner
with exogenous output price (small country assumption)
oversimplifying and unrealistic. We agree that a public
choice type of approach would represent government
behavior more accurately if that were the main objective of
the analysis. Our inclusion of the government and our
emphasis in the process of production of public goods has
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more to do with the endogenous growth hypothesis that
motivates our study than with a close description of actual
government behavior in general. We hypothesized endog-
enous growth for the sector. The sector includes not only
the firms involved in using public goods, but the govern-
ment involved in producing these goods, and then test for
endogenous growth. In Karagiannis words, we view these
public goods as external to the firms but internal to the
whole sector, including in the sector the entity that pro-
duces these goods, the government. We think that, within
this objective, the assumption of a benevolent social
planner as a simplified model of government behavior is a
start. The small country assumption for this sector (i.e.
exogenous output prices) implies that the government can
decide separately the optimal provision of public goods for
producers and consumers, these decisions are separable. In
addition, exogenous prices allow a theoretically consistent
modeling of production waste. If we were instead inter-
ested in a measure of welfare that includes consumers then
we would have to specify a welfare function for society (or
an expenditure function) as well as the production structure
(the cost structure used in this paper) and a budget con-
straint for the economy. We think that for the purpose of
testing the endogenous growth hypothesis in the US agri-
cultural sector, a focus on productive efficiency is a start as
it is a necessary even though it might not be a sufficient
condition for welfare maximization. We do agree though
that, if one is comfortable with the specification of a social
welfare function, including the consumer would lead to a
broader measure of welfare that includes efficiency, as well
as equity considerations. Producers and consumers deci-
sions then might not be separable and some prices would
be endogenous.
In this paragraph we answer some of the remaining
theoretical questions raised by Førsund. The benevolent
social planner uses shadow prices to adjust optimally. At a
true steady state, private and public decision makers have
reached their optimal levels of stocks and optimal
replacement rate. If there are increasing returns to scale
over all inputs (private and public), there is only a steady
state ‘‘perceived’’ by the firm because it takes public inputs
as given. In other words, for the firm there is a steady state
for a particular level of G and R. However, if the gov-
ernment provides G and R to increase the returns of the
firms, and consequently the firms invest in K, then, at the
aggregate, there is no steady state but there is continuous
growth.
It is plausible that given the multiple public goods
provided by the government to different agents and sectors
of the economy, some resources are wasted in the decision
making process. At a minimum there will be costs related
to the calculations needed for this reallocation of resources.
These are part of the government’s adjustment costs.
2 Empirical modeling issues
Comments on this section have to do with the data as well
as with the estimation approach used and we will address
them in this order.
Alvarez, Thirtle, Karagiannis, and Førsund offer
comments on issues related to the R&D variable used in the
study. We use two different public R&D stock variables,
one is constructed from public R&D spending in agricul-
ture reported by Alston and Pardey (1996) and used with
the estimation based on the USDA data set. The other is
constructed from public R&D spending in agriculture
reported by Thirtle et al. (2002) and used in the estimation
based on the data set provided by these authors. Both
stocks were calculated as a weighted sum of the last
30 years of expenditures with weights following an
inverted ‘‘V’’ pattern. A trapezoidal pattern of 35 years was
also used with no significance difference in estimation. We
do use only spending in agricultural R&D, we do build
stocks, but we impose exogenously the length and shape of
the lags basing our choice on work for US agriculture by
Evenson, Huffman and Evenson, Chavas and Cox, and
Alston and Pardey. We agree with Thirtle that endogenous
determination of the length and shape is desirable and we
are in the process of implementing this approach on work
that is in process.
The public infrastructure variable represents public
capital stocks obtained from the Survey of Current Busi-
ness and includes buildings, highways, streets, sewer
structures, etc., excluding military spending. This variable
captures infrastructure stock for the whole economy and in
this sense it might not be appropriate. More work is needed
to identify that portion of public infrastructure that would
most directly affect performance of the agricultural sector
(for example Huffman and Evenson (1989) has used
highway capital stock.) We recognize the problem and we
place very little emphasis on estimates related to this var-
iable. We are in the process of redefining this variable to
use in new estimations that would also benefit from panel
data for 48 US states.
We agree with Alvarez on the importance of the
Extension variable and we are troubled by the omission as
we mentioned in the text. We believe that this variable
should not be bundled with public R&D stocks and should
enter as a separate public input due to its distinctive nature
and the potentially interesting interactions with the other
public inputs. Our theoretical model is easily extended to
include this additional public input but we cannot say the
same of our empirical model. The addition of one more
variable adds information but, given the short nature of the
time series, the number of extra parameters implied by the
flexible form, and the fact that public R&D stocks and
Extension are highly collinear, we chose to omit this
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important variable. We are planning to include this variable
in a new study where degrees of freedom have been
increased due to the panel nature of the data.
We cannot say the same about the omission, mentioned
by Førsund, of the private R&D stock in our model. The
theoretical model we use only lends itself easily to the
inclusion of this effect through prices paid by producers for
innovations that are embodied mostly in inputs such a
seeds, pesticides, and other chemicals. Private R&D is not
a public input and it is produced under different degrees of
appropriability and restrictive entry originating rents. If one
is interested in modeling the process of private innovations
it should be done allowing for an imperfectly competitive
market structure as most of the literature has done since
these earlier models of endogenous growth. We expect that
a model that incorporates an explanation for private R&D
stock would look very different than the one used in this
paper.
In terms of embodied technical change, we know that
USDA’s data set has incorporated corrections for input
quality changes. An inclusion of a time trend, as suggested
by Alvarez, to ‘pick up’ everything that has not been
captured by other variables is not easily done given the
colinearity that exists between the trend and some of the
other variables.
The most important comment on estimation choice is
that of Tsionas, who comments on the potential rigidity
imposed by the algorithm we use in the Bayesian estima-
tion and suggests an alternative. The Bayesian estimates in
our study were motivated by our discovery that the unre-
stricted maximum likelihood estimates did not satisfy the
restrictions specified by economic theory. We do not know
of any test that would help us decide the appropriate model
that would balance the statistical characteristics of the data
and the restrictions implied by economic theory. We felt
uncomfortable giving a zero weight to the information in
the data and of unity to the restrictions derived from eco-
nomic theory if we were to proceed with restricted
maximum likelihood estimates. Although we understand
that behavioral restrictions are necessary in modeling the
economic behavior of the firm, we decided to complement
the maximum likelihood estimates with Bayesian estimates
that would provide some sense of how restrictive are these
economic requirements on this particular aggregate data
set. It is in this spirit that we present the Bayesian esti-
mates. We follow closely the procedures that Griffiths et al.
(1999), O’Donnell et al. (1999) and O’Donnell (2002) have
used on a similar data set for US agriculture. Other papers
have used Gibbs sampling which, according to Chib and
Greenberg (1996) is another type of Markov Chain Monte
Carlo simulation method. In fact, Chib and Greenberg
point out that Gibbs sampling is a special case of the
Metropolis-Hasting algorithm. Examples are Atkinson and
Dorfman (2005), and Terrel (1996). As a result of the
Bayesian estimation, we do get the extra information we
were looking for: that the behavioral restrictions are
binding. In addition, we obtain a set of Bayesian parame-
ters that could be use as alternative to the maximum
likelihood ones. Given the importance we place on eco-
nomic behavior, we nevertheless proceed to impose
behavioral restrictions for the purpose of economic analy-
sis. It is here where Tsionas contributions might make a
difference as he hypothesizes that these results (i.e. the
restrictions are binding) are driven by ‘‘the inherent
inability of the general purpose MCMC algorithms (like
the MH) to deal with stiff sets of inequality constraints.’’
The implication would be that with the use of a more
appropriate numerical technique we might reverse our
conclusion that the restrictions are binding and then pro-
ceed to restrict the maximum likelihood estimates or use
the alternative Bayesian estimates, but this time with more
confidence and without apologies. This certainly would
make our results more appealing.
Tsionas goes further and proposes an estimation
approach, described in detail in his comments, that he
thinks promising ‘‘to deal with stiff restrictions in general
econometric models.’’ We are curious about the implica-
tions for our study and are considering its implementation
with improved data. It would certainly be the subject of
another study and, if we proceed, we would communicate
with Professor Tsionas and acknowledge his contributions.
At this point we would like to remind the reader about
the restrictions required by the theory in this study. There
are three sets of restrictions:
(1) those derived from economic theory of the firm and
necessary for a technology to be ‘well behaved’ (i.e.
equality, monotonicity, concavity, homogeneity,
etc.);
(2) those derived from a dynamic formulation of pro-
ducer behavior and necessary for convergence of the
dynamic model (i.e. stability, Euler, adjustment cost,
etc.); and,
(3) those derived from the hypothesis of endogenous
growth for the sector (i.e. nonnegative shadow price
of public inputs, public inputs increase steady state
stock of private capital, and increasing returns overall
factors of production, public and private).
In addition, even when the sector has two types of
decision makers (private firms and government); in
econometric implementation we were explicit only about
private decision makers. Instead of specifying and fitting
the value function for the benevolent social planner that
nests the one for the private decision makers, we fitted the
value function of private decision makers and instrumented
the public inputs. This approach created some confusion
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(Karagiannis’ comments) and might have introduced
additional problems in estimation.
Given the ‘stiffness’ of the restrictions, the potential
problems in choice of instruments, and the use of aggregate
data, before investing too much on alternative numerical
algorithms, as suggested by Tsionas, we think it would be
important to investigate the impact of the maintained
hypotheses implied by a dynamic model, endogenous
growth, the flexible form chosen, and the choice of
instruments.
We realize that by instrumenting the value function of
private decision makers instead of fitting the value function
of the government (that nests the one of private decisions
makers) we might have confused the reader. We agree with
Karagiannis that public inputs are exogenous to private
decision makers (but endogenous to the sector) and are
treated that way in estimation. We do open the possibility
that weak instruments might have interfered with this
approach and that it might be better to explicitly fit the
value function of the benevolent decision maker. In this
case there would be no gap between theory and application,
we would not have problems derived from potentially weak
instruments, and it would be transparent that the endoge-
nous growth hypothesis applies to the sector. On the other
hand, we would need information on r, the rental price of G
(see problem (8) in the paper).
This paragraph includes responses to other issues raised
by Tsionas. We do agree that the draws are dependent by
construction. We could use another algorithm that is not
random but centered at the maximum likelihood estimator
subject to restrictions but this would be appropriate for
another study that could center on the importance on dif-
ferent algorithms for sampling. We look at the (non)
stationarity properties of the data only as a diagnostic
device and because other papers claimed that, given these
characteristics, maximum likelihood would not be the
appropriate. The analysis was presented in an appendix that
is not part of the paper anymore and for purpose of session
discussion.
The interactions between public R&D and public
infrastructure are estimated as Karagiannis suggests. We
are including comparison to other studies as Thirtle and
Karagiannis request.
The main objective of the paper was not to estimate
derived demands or TFP as Buccola seems to suggest,
although we get them as byproduct. Our objective is to test
a type of growth postulated by the AK model of endoge-
nous growth (as in Romer and Barro). If this hypothesis is
not rejected then we have evidence that public policy,
through the provision of public inputs, could have had an
enduring effect on sectoral growth as opposed to a one-
time effect. This would make public inputs an incredibly
powerful policy tool. To do so we model the agricultural
sector as comprised of two decision makers, one public the
other private, that realize that their present choices are
influenced by the past, present, and future. In this context
we derive specific restrictions (positive shadows of public
inputs, a positive effect of public inputs on private capital,
and increasing returns in all inputs) consistent with the
AK-type of growth that we test. We are unable to reject the
hypothesis given the numerous other maintained hypothe-
ses derived from economic theory and empirical
implementation that are nested in our problem. We do
obtain estimates of derived demands, among other
parameters, but these are not central to the paper. The TFP
estimate Buccola suggests is an interesting and novel
extension to this paper, although its actual estimate would
be compromised given that the technology we estimate is
not ‘well behaved.’ We proceed then with its derivation
and estimation and present a summary of these results here
(complete derivations and estimation in Onofri and Fulg-
initi (2006). Following the procedure in Luh and Stefanou
(1991), but allowing here for changes in shadow values,
TFP change can be expressed as
dTFP ¼y^ 
h
Fm þ FK þ FL þ FJK þ FJL þ F
K
 þ F
L
 :
þFG þ FJG þ FR þ FJR
i ð1Þ
where Fm measures the proportional growth in variable
factors; Fk and FL quantify the growth in the stocks of
quasi-fixed factors; FJK and FJL represent the weighted
changes in the endogenous marginal values of capital and
labor; F
K
 and F
L
 measure the growth in net investments;
FG and FR measure the proportional growth in public
inputs; and FJG and FJR reflect the growth of the shadow
values of public inputs. Additionally, we define
‘Private Scale’ = ð1=ecy  1Þ ðFmþFK þ FL þ FJK þ FJL þ
F
K
 þ F
L
 Þ and ‘Public Scale’ ¼ ð1=ecy  1Þ ðFG þ FJG þ
FR þ FJRÞ where ecy is the elasticity of cost with respect
to output. Finally, technical change is obtained residually:
A^ ¼ dTFP  ‘Private Scale’  ‘Public Scale’
Table 1 presents the results for this decomposition of
technical change. This table is similar to Table 4 in Luh
and Stefanou (1991) and Table 5 in Luh and Stefanou
(1993). The difference is that they do not include the
components for changes in the shadow values.
The average rate of TFP growth for the whole period is
1.4%. The scale effect on private inputs explains almost
0.6% (40% of the growth rate). Although the average
‘public scale’ component is negative, the contribution of G
and R to output growth is nearly 0.5% and 0.2% per year,
respectively (components FG and FR). The ‘public scale’
component of -0.1% is explained by negative estimates
for FJG and FJR. These two components represent the
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contribution of changes in the shadow values of G and R
due to changes in the quasi-fixed inputs K and L. More
detail on theoretical derivation and estimates are found in
Onofri and Fulginiti (2006).
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